The conduct which was the subject of the charges occurred over a five-year period. The client, Ms A, approached Mr Medlicott for assistance with a family law matter in 2015. While the matter did not proceed, Ms A and Mr Medlicott remained in contact and developed a friendship. In late 2016, Ms A asked Mr Medlicott to act for her in a privacy matter. It was around this time that Mr Medlicott became concerned with his ability to act in a detached and professional manner. Mr Medlicott arranged for a barrister to be instructed but remained involved as the instructing solicitor. Between January and April 2017, Ms A and Mr Medlicott had an intimate personal relationship. After the intimate personal relationship ended in May 2017, Mr Medlicott remained as the instructing solicitor for the privacy matter and continued to advise Ms A in respect of her will.

In September 2019, Mr Medlicott discovered that his computer had been accessed by a third party and private information concerning Ms A may have been disclosed. Mr Medlicott informed Ms A of this potential privacy breach shortly after. On 11 October 2019, a meeting was held between Ms A, the barrister and Mr Medlicott to discuss the issue and Ms A’s representation in the future. In November 2019, another practitioner took over the role of instructing solicitor for the privacy matter. Ms A also instructed another counsel to assist her with her claim against Mr Medlicott for the breach of confidentiality. In response to this claim, Mr Medlicott proposed settlement that included gifting Ms A a section of land, as well as a small dwelling to go on it. Ms A’s counsel drafted a settlement agreement reflecting the terms offered. Before the agreement was finalised, Mr Medlicott again took up the role of instructing solicitor. Between February 2020 and October 2021, Mr Medlicott provided Ms A with $55,000 of financial assistance, including paying her rent and bills. In addition, he did not charge for any of his legal services over the five-year period in question.

In terms of liability, Mr Medlicott accepted that he should not have continued to act for Ms A given the nature of their relationship and while they were finalising the settlement agreement, and that this amounted to negligence in his professional capacity that brought the profession into disrepute. The Tribunal found that the negligence was at the lower to moderate end of the scale and that it had been caused in part by Mr Medlicott’s sense of duty to Ms A. It further noted that Ms A had derived considerable benefit from his ongoing support. It characterised the negligence as “misguided and lacking clear awareness of his professional responsibilities.” The Tribunal noted that Mr Medlicott took some steps to mitigate the conflict by involving a barrister at an early stage, but this was insufficient, and that Mr Medlicott should have ended the retainer with Ms A when he recognised his objectivity was compromised. Mr Medlicott accepted that the breach of confidentiality was unsatisfactory conduct. The Tribunal noted this breach was “sloppy and unintentional”, but the responsibility lay more with the other party and commended Mr Medlicott for informing Ms A of the breach.

In terms of mitigating factors, the Tribunal considered Mr Medlicott had demonstrated a high level of insight given he accepted responsibility for his failings and had engaged with the disciplinary process. It noted that “a lawyer who accepts his or her professional failing as soon as it is pointed out and takes responsibility for making amends is likely to find favour in that response from professional disciplinary bodies.” This approach was reinforced by his decision not to seek name suppression. In addition, Mr Medlicott had “gone beyond what might be expected to make amends” and had not sought to blame Ms A. Further, in his 37 years of practice, Mr Medlicott had no previous disciplinary findings. He had received “glowing” refences and he had sought support to address any personal matters which may have led to his errors in judgment.

In terms of penalty, Mr Medlicott was censured, the terms of the settlement deed were made part of the final determination of the matter, and Mr Medlicott was ordered to pay costs.